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"own" or "owner ", when not modified by other words in~ 
dicating either qualified or absolute ownership, depends upon 
the subject-matter and the circumstances surrounding the 
subject-matter and the parties. (RCA Photophone, Inc., v. 
Huffman, supraj Prudential Ins. Co. v. Kraschel, supraj Bare 
v. Cole, 220 Iowa 338 [260 N. W. 338].) Thus while in the 
State of Iowa it has been held that a mortgagee is an "owner" 
under the ordinary tax redemption statute (Lane v. Wright, 
121 Iowa, 376 [96 N. W. 902, 100 Am. St. Rep. 362]), it 
has also been held that a junior mortgagee, who had fore-
closed and obtained a sheriff's deed and reserved a deficiency 
judgment prior to foreclosure by a senior mortgagee, was 
not entitled to an extension of the period of redemption from 
the sale under the senior mortgage, since such junior mort-
gagee was not an "owner" within the meaning of emergency 
legislation relating to the extension of the redemption period 
from sale under a mortgage on application of the owner of 
the land. (Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Kramer, 218 Iowa, 
80 [253 N. W. 809].) The court declared in the case last 
cited that" The undoubted objective of the legislation is to 
extend grace to the owner or debtor as between him and his 
creditor and to protect as far as possible the status quo be-
tween the parties and to defer for a brief time the debtor's 
ejection from the premises." The effect of the foregoing cases 
is, therefore, that a mortgagee may be an owner within the 
meaning of redemption statutes generally, but he is not such 
an owner as may benefit by emergency legislation enacted 
specifically to defer the dispossession of landowners by extend-
ing the owners' time for redemption. This must likewise be 
the result in the present controversy. That is, while the 
plaintiff as ~ortgagee may be entitled to redeem under the 
general and unrestricted language of section 47 of the Cali-
fornia Irrigation District Act, it may not be recogni~ed as 
an owner within the meaning of special emergency legisla-
tion which purports to extend exclusively to landowners cer-
tain privileges and moratoria in the matter of redemption 
of their delinquent lands. An interpretation of the emer. 
gency statutes by giving effect to the language actually em-
ployed without interpolation is in accordance with the de-
clared legislative objective. The mortgagee, on the other 
hand, was not deprived of the right open to it to redeem 
~ 
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under the general statute, section 47, of the Irrigation District 
Act. 
The ju.dgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Curtis, J., con-
curred. 
Mr. Justice Houser did not participate in the foregoing 
decision. 
[L. A. No. 16728. In Bank.-December 26, 1940.] 
In the Matter of the Estate of ELLA W. KALT, Deceased. 
EARL D. KALT et al., Appellants, v. LEO V. YOUNG-
WORTH, as Administrator, etc., Respondent. 
[1] FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES - CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO ACTION-
NECESSITY FOR JUDGMENT OR LIEN.-Under the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act (Civ. Code, sees. 3439-3440.5) every transfer of 
property made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor 
of the transferor can be set aside or disregarded by the creditor, 
even though he has no judgment or lien. 
[2] WILLS-RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES-GEN-
ERAL CONSIDERATIONS-TIME OF VESTING OF DEVISES AND BEQUESTS. 
Title to property passing by will vests in the legatee at the death 
of the testator, subject to the possession and control of the personal 
representative during the administration and probate of the estate. 
(Prob. Code, sec. 300.) 
[3] FRAUDULENT CONVEYANOES-TRANSFERS-IN GENERAL--RENUNCIA-
TION BY LEGATEE.-A renunciation of a legacy by a legatee after the 
death of the testator is in effect a transfer of title within the 
statute as to fraudulent conveyances (see Civ. Code, sec. 3441 [re-
pealed]; Civ. Code, secs. 3439-3440.5), and may constitute a fraudu-
lent conveyance which is ineffective as against the lien of a credi-
tor. This is true even under the rule that title does not pass until 
the legatee accepts, since the power in the legatee, being analogous 
to a general power of appointment under a will, caunot be exer-
cised to defeat rights of creditors. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers, 
§ 79; 2. Wills, § 395; 3,4. Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers, § 5; 
5. Doctrine of Relation; 6,8. Wills, § 394; 1. Deeds, § 59; 9. Dece-
dents' Estates, § 1031, 
.. 
808 ESTATE OF KALT. [16 C. (2d) 
[4] ID.-TRANSFERS-IN GENERAIr-EXERCISE OF PowER.-The donee 
of a general power of appointment may not exercise it in favor 
of a third person, other than a bona fide purchaser for value, when 
the claim of a creditor would be defeated; such exercise may be 
treated as a fraudulent conveyance, provided insolvency or an intent 
to defraud be· present. 
[5] DOCTRINE OF RELATION.-The fiction of "relation back" may not be 
invoked to destroy the rights of third persons. 
[6] WILLS-RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES-Ac· 
CEPTANCE - RENUNCIA'rION-DETRIMENTAL BEQUESTs.-The renun· 
ciation of detrimental bequests may be sanctioned as a matter of 
policy, and it is unnecessary to invoke the doctrine of acceptance 
to justify it. 
[7] DEEDS-REQUISITES-DELIVERY-AccEPTANcE.-The principle that a 
conveyance is effective to vest title even before the grantee has con· 
sented to receive it is given recognition in California and other 
jurisdictions in the rule that a beneficial gift is presumed to have 
been accepted by the donee, even without his knowledge or consent. 
(See Civ. Code, sec. 1059, subd. 2.) 
[8] WILL8-'RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES-Ac-
CEPTANCE - RENUNCIATION - BENEFICIAL BEQUESTS.-A legatee is 
free to renounce a beneficial bequest, unless claims of creditors 
would be defeated, in which case his wishes are subservient to his 
obligations. 
[9] DECEDENTS' ESTATES-FINAL DISTRIDUTION-DECREE OF DISTRIBU· 
TION-IN GENERAu---DISREGARDING FRAUDULENT RENUNCIATION BY 
LEGATEE.-A court decreeing distribution of an estate should give 
no effect to a renunciation of a bequest made in fraud of a legatee's 
creditors, and it may properly direct that the subject of the bequest 
be delivered to the officer who levied an attachment on the interest 
of the legatee. 
APPEAL from a decree of the Superior Court of Los An-
geles County, distributing an estate. Elliot Craig, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Wolfson & Swetow, Burnett Wolfson, Earl 1. Swetow and 
Herbert Schwab for Appellant. 
Leo V. Youngworth, in pro. per., and J. Harold Decker for 
Respondent. 
8. Right of creditors to complain of, or control, debtor's renuncia-
tion of benefit under will, or his election to take under or against the 
will, note, 27 A. L. R. 47:t 
~ 
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TRAYNOR, J.-In 1932 Ella Kalt died leaving a will in 
which she bequeathed the residue of her estate to her two 
sons, Earl Kalt and Stanley Kalt, after making certain minor 
bequests to their wives and to her grandchildren. Stanley 
Kalt was appointed executor by the probate court pursuant to 
the terms of the will. Shortly thereafter two actions on 
promissory notes were commenced against Stanley Kalt, in 
his individual capacity, and his wife Loretta, by Leo Young-
worth, administrator of the estate of R. F. Goings. Writs of 
attachment were levied upon the interests of Stanley and 
Loretta Kalt in the personal property belonging to the estate 
of Ella Kalt. Youngworth secured judgments of $1121.38 
and $1239.91 against the Kalts and had the abstracts of the 
judgments recorded. He secured the issuance of orders for 
the examination of the judgment debtors under supplemen-
tary proceedings; hearings were held but no satisfaction of 
the jUdgments was obtained. Some four years elapsed. 
Then in 1936 Stanley Kalt in his individual capacity executed 
a written instrument entitled" Renunciation ", as did his wife 
Loretta Kalt. Both instruments were filed in the records of 
the probate proceedings. By these renunciations Stanley and 
Loretta Kalt renounced any interest which they had in the 
estate of Ella Kalt as heirs, legatees, or devisees. The find-
ings establish that the Kalts filed the renunciations expressly 
to defeat the collection of the judgments; they freely admitted 
that they executed the renunciations "because they realized 
that any share or interest which they might have in the estate 
and which would be distributed to them would be taken by the 
attaching creditor, and as long as they were going to lose it, 
they preferred to have Earl Kalt receive the share or interest 
in the estate which they, or either of them, might otherwise 
have. " 
In 1937 Stanley Kalt filed his final report as executor of 
the estate of Ella Kalt and petitioned for distribution of the 
estate. The report and petition, referring to the renuncia_ 
tions, requested the court to distribute the residue of the es-
tate to Earl Kalt, the remaining residuary legatee. '1'he 
judgment creditor objected to the petition for such a final dis-
tribution. After a regular hearing the probate Court issued 
a decree of distribution which gave no effect to the renuncia-
tions filed by Stanley and Loretta Kalt and provided that all 
personal property bequeathed to either or both of them under t ·:"1 
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the terms of the will should be delivered to the officer making 
the levy under the writ of attachment secured by Young-
worth. From this order Stanley, Loretta and Earl Kalt have 
appealed. 
There is thus presented to this court a question of first in-
stance in this state: Whether a legatee under a will may defeat 
the claims of his creditors by renouncing his legacy. The 
courts in four states hold that the right of the donee or 
legatee to renounce is absolute even as against his creditors. 
(Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa, 474 [187 N. W. 20, 27 
A. t. R. 465]'; Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Iowa, 658 [239 N. W. 
564] ; Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53 [109 S. W. 502, 19 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 595] ; People v. Flanagin, 331 TIL 203 [162 
N. E. 848, 60 A. L. R. 305] ; Bradford v. Leake, 124 Tenn. 
312 [137 S. W. 96, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1140] ; In re Meiburg, 
1 Fed. Supp. 892 at 895; McGarry v. Mathis, 226 Iowa, 37 
[282N. W. 786]; Gottstein v. Hedges, 210 Iowa, 272 [228 
N. W.' 93, 67 A. L. R. 1218] ; Carter v. Carter, 63 N. J. Eq. 
726 [53 Atl. 160] ; see 27 A. L. R. 477; 18 Cal. L. Rev. 298; 37 
Mich. L. Rev. 1168; 43 Yale L. J. 1030.) They derive this 
rule from the theory that a man cannot be compelled to take 
property against his will, and the fiction that the renunciation ~ 
"relates back" to the time the gift was made. (Ibid.) It is 
far from an absolute rule, however, for the courts have denied 
to the donee or legatee the right to renounce as against his 
creditors: (1) Where there has been a long delay before 
renouncing (Crumpler v. Barfield &; W",'Zson Co., 114 Ga. 570 
[40 S. E. 808]; Storm v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556 [164 Pac. 
1100] ; In re Howe's Estate, 112 N. J. Eq. 17 [163 Atl. 234]) ; 
(2) Where there has been collusion between the debtor and 
those benefiting by the disclaimer (Schoonover v. Osborne, 
supra; Bradford v. Calhoun, supra); (3) Where the donee 
has caused his creditors to rely upon his apparent acceptance 
(Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697; Lehr v. Switzer, supra; Ex parte 
Fuller, 2 Story, 327 [Fed. Cas. No. 5,147]. See Kearley v. 
Crawford, 112 Fla. 43 [151 So. 293].) 
Some courts have subscribed outright to the view that a 
legatee may not renounce his bequest to defeat his creditors. 
(Estate of Buckius, 4 Pa. Dist. Rep. 775; Daniel v. Frost, 
62 Ga. 697; Ex parte Fuller, 2 Story, 327 [Fed. Cas. No. 
5,147],) 
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[1] Under the law of California at the time of the re-
nunciations under consideration, every transfer of property 
made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor of the 
transferor was fraudulent and could be set aside or disre-
garded by such creditor (Civ. Code, sec. 3439) provided he 
had a specific lien on the property or had prosecuted his claim 
to judgment. (Civ. Code, sec. 3441, now repealed; Moore v. 
Schneider, 196 Cal. 380 [238 Pac. 81]; Thomas v. Lavery, 
126 Cal. App. 787 [14 Pac. (2d) 160].) Under the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act now in force in this state no 
judgment or lien is necessary. (Civ. Code, secs. 3439, 3440.5, 
repealing Civ. Code, sec. 3441; Glenn, Fraudulent Convey-
ances [Revised ed.], sec. 76.) The renunciations in this case 
were admittedly made to defeat the judgments obtained by re-
spondent. They must therefore be regarded as fraudulent 
conveyances if they constituted transfers of property within 
the meaning of the act. (See Civ. Code, sec. 3439.01.) It 
thus becomes necessary to determine whether or not the 
legatees had an interest in the property which could be trans-
ferred. 
[2, 3] In California, title to property passing by will vests 
in the legatee at the date of the death of the testator, subject 
to the possession and control of the personal representative 
) 
during the administration and probate of the estate. (Prob. 
Code, sec. 300; U. S. Fidelity etc. Co. v. Mathews, 207 
Cal. 556 [279 Pac. 655].) Therefore, a renunciation by 
the legatee after the death of the testator is in effect a tra~s­
fer by him of the title he has acquired. By renouncing the 
legacy he conveys away the property as effectively as if he 
had assigned his interest to the ultimate recipient. In this 
state the assignment by a legatee of his legacy under a will 
during probate is a fraudulent conveyance ineffective as 
against the prior lien of a creditor. (McGee v. Allen, 7 Cal. 
(2d) 468 [60 Pac. (2d) 1026]; Hopkins v. White, 20 Cal. 
App. 234 [128 Pac. 780].) 
Some jurisdictions hold that title to property does not pass 
by will to a legatee until he accepts. (Page, Wills (2d ed.), 
sec. 1233.) Nevertheless, when a testator dies, the legatee ob-
tains a power, in itself a limited right of ownership (see 51 
Harv. L. Rev. 1141 at 1159), to determine the ultimate dispo-
~ition of the property regardless of acceptance on his part. If 
.. 
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he makes no renunciation, the full title will vest in him when 
he acquires possession and control. If he chooses to renounce, 
he determines by that action that the title will pass on to some 
other heir or legatee. This power is essentially analogous to 
a general power of appointment under a will. [4] It is 
well established that the donee of a general power of appoint-
ment cannot exercise it in favor of some third person, other 
than a bona fide purchaser for value, when the claim of his 
creditors would thereby be defeated. (A. L. 1. Restatement 
of Property, Tentative Draft No.7, sec. 452; Glenn, Fraudu-
lent Conveyances [Revised ed.], sec. 158; see, also, cases 
collected and commente.d on in 22 Ill. L. Rev. 504.) If he 
attempts to do so the creditors may treat the exercise of the 
power as a fraudulent conveyance, provided the necessary 
factor of insolvency or intent to defraud is present. (Ibid. ) 
This rule is applied though the debtor is given no interest 
in the property other than this general power of appointment 
and though the original donor of the power contemplated 
that the debtor-donee would probably exercise it in favor of 
someone other than himself. (Glenn, Fraudulent Convey-
ances [Revised ed.], sec. 158.) The debtor is in effect forced 
to exercise the power in favor of himself if he exercises it at 
all, and to accept the property even against his will. The 
principle that the exercise of a general power of appointment 
by a debtor may be a fraudulent conveyance as to his credi-
tors clearly supports the rule we adopt in the present case that 
a renunciation of a bequest by a legatee may likewise be a 
fraudulent conveyance. 
[5] A renunciation cannot serve to defeat the claims of 
creditors unless it is related back to the date of the testator's 
death. The fiction of "relation back" is occasionally em-
ployed to protect the rights of third parties. It cannot be in-
voked to destroy rights it was designed to protect without 
gross distortion. In the present situation its application 
would deprive the creditor of the renouncing legatees of the 
oniy means of satisfying his judgments, merely to yield a 
windfall to the ultimate recipierit of the property. 
[6] When' bequests are detrimental courts sanction their 
renunciation by legatees as a matter of policy since no injury 
to creditors is involved. (Healy v. Stevens, 347 Ill. 202 [179 
N. E.535]; Elwood.1.'r.ust 00. v. Fritz, 192 Ind. 58 [135 N. E. 
:'! 
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145] ; Derry Bank v. Webster, 44 N. H. 264; People v. Flana-
gin, supra; In re Stone's Estate, 132 Iowa 136 [109 N. W. 
455, 10 Ann. Cas. ]033] ;.In re Wolfe's Estate, 89 App. Div. 
349 [85 N. Y. Supp. 949]-;) In such cases they need hold 
only that the legatee can avoid the unwelcome burdens by 
making the renunciation. They need not advance the need-
less elaboration that the renunciation obviates an acceptance 
which would effectuate the bequest. The renunciation is it-
self adequate to relieve the legatee of burdensome property 
and there is no necessity to hold that he never acquired the 
property because he never accepted it. The doctrine that 
acceptance is necessary to effectuate a gift has given ready 
expression to the policy of enabling legatees to avoid detri-
mental bequests. Its convenience in this regard, however, 
does not make of it an absolute test for determining when 
property vests. 
[7] "There is no intrinsic difficulty in regarding a con-
veyance as effective to vest property in the grantee even before 
the latter has consented to receive it." (Tiffany, Real Prop-
erty, 3d ed., sec. 1055, p. 253; Brown, Personal Property, sec. 
50; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, sec. 150, p. 447.) This 
principle is recognized by the majority of the courts, includ-
ing those in California, when they hold that a beneficial gift is 
presumed to be accepted by the donee even without his knowl-
edge or consent. (See Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 1059, subd. 2; 
Neely v. Buster, 50 Cal. App. 695 [195 Pac. 736] ; De Levil-
lain v. Evans, 39 Cal. 120; Lehr v. Switzer, supra; Bradford 
v. Calhoun, sttpra.) A beneficial conveyance to a person in-
capable of accepting, such as an infant or one who is non 
compos mentis, is "conclusively presumed" to be accepted in 
California (Turner v. Turner, 173 Cal. 782 [161 Pac. 980]) 
and in other jurisdictions. (Staggers v. White, 121 Ark. 
328 [181 S. W. 139] ; Egan v. Egan, 301 Ill. 124 [133 N. E. 
663] ; Vaughan v. Godman, 94 Ind. 191; Campbell v. Kuhn, 
45 Mich. 513 [8 N. W. 523, 40 Am. Rep. 479]; Fenton v. 
Fenton, 261 Mo. 202 [168 S. W. 1152] ; Davis v. Garrett, 91 
Tenn. 147 [18 S. W. 113].) A conveyance in trust is usually 
held to vest the legal title in the trustee even without accept-
ance or knowledge on his part. (Adams v. Adams, 2] Wall. 
185 [22 L. Ed. 504] ; Devol v. Dye, 123 Ind. 321 [24 N. E. 246, 
7 L. R. A. 439] ; Minot v. Tilton, 64 N. H. 371 [10 Atl. 682] : 
Gulick v. Gulick, 39 N. J. Eq. 401; Myrover v. French, 73 
! i 
... 
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N. O. 609; Read v. Robinson (Pa.), 6 Watts & S. 329; Talbot 
v. Talbot, 32 R. 1. 72 [78 Atl. 535, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1221] ; 
Furman v. Fisher, (Tenn.) 4 Cold. 626 [94 Am. Dec. 210].) 
A deed of trust vests the equitable interest in the beneficiary 
without any knowledge or acceptance on his part in California 
(Civ. Oode, sec. 2251; Booth v. Oakland Bank of Savings, 122 
Cal. 19 [54 Pac. 370] ; Cahlan v. Bank of Lassen County, 11 
Cal. App. 533 [105 Pac. 765] ; Sherman v. Hibernia Savings 
& Loan Soc., 129 Cal. App. (Supp.) 795, 798 [20 Pac. (2d) 
138] ) and elsewhere. (Brooks v. Marbury, 11 Wheat. 78 
[6 L. Ed. 423] ; Security Trust &Safe Deposit Co. v. Farrady, 
93 Del. Ch. 306 [82 Atl. 24] ; Koch v. Streuter, 232 Ill. 594 
[83 N. E. 1072] ; Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212 [43 Atl. 
43, 44 L. R. A. 205] ; Boston v. Turner, 201 Mass. 190 [87 
N. E. 634] ; Marquette v. Wilkinson, 119 Mich. 413, 414 [78 
N. W. 474, 43 L. R. A. 840] ; Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134 
[31 Am. Rep. 446] ; Skipwith's Exrs. v. Cunningham, 8 Leigh 
(Va.), 271, 272 [31 Am. Dec. 642]; A. L. 1. Restatement, 
Trusts, sec .. 36.) 
[8] A legatee is free to renounce even a beneficial bequest, 
so long as the rights of third parties are not involved. If, 
however, the claims of his creditors would thereby be defeated 
he cannot exercise the same freedom. His own wishes then 
become subservient to his obligations. A creditor who is 
legally entitled to set aside a fraudulent conveyance may exer-
cise the debtor's right to contest a will even though the debtor 
himself does not wish to do so. (Brooks v. Paine, 123 Ky. 271 
[90 S. W. 600]; In re Langevin's Will, 45 Minn. 429 [47 
N. W. 1133] ; Bloor v. Platt, 78 Ohio St. 46 [84 N. E. 605, 
14 Ann. Cas. 332].) If the creditor contested the will suc-
cessfully it would be ironic to leave the debtor free to renounce 
the ensuing benefits. A debtor may be compelled not only to 
retain his property for the benefit of his creditors, but to dis-
pose of it for the same purpose. There is a like obligation 
upon him of which he may acquit himself without hardship, 
to avail himself of a bequest. '£he denial to the debtor of 
the right to renounce as against his creditors in fact benefits 
his own economic interests as well as those of his creditors. 
(18 Cal. L. Rev. 298, 302.) 
[9] We therefore hold that where, as in this case, a legatee 
renounces his bequest in fraud of his creditors, the probate 
c.~ .... _._._, __ , ••. ;---"--:"'~.-" .. ;:.:-.. ;; ,,-,-,,-,,-,~~-,,-,-.--~.~ •. -.-
:! 
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court should give the renunciation no effect in issuing the de-
cree of distribution. . 
The order appealed from is affirmed. 
Gibson, O. J., Ourtis, J., Oarter, J., Edmonds, J., and 
Shenk, ~r., concurred. 
Mr. J'ustice Houser did not participate in the foregoing 
decision., 
[L. A. No. 16494. In Bank.-December 26, 1940.] 
HARRISON R. WARD, Appellant, v. CITY OF MONRO-
VIA (a Municipal Oorporation) et aI., Respondents. 
[1] WAT.E:RS-PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTIONS AND 
BURDEN OF PROOF--ABANDONMEN'l' OR Loss OF WATER RIGHT.-A 
plaintiff claiming the right to waters seeping from a water system 
on the ground that they had been alilandoned 01' that the defend-
ant's right thereto had been lost by a non-user for a period of 
five years, has the burden of proving Hs right. 
[2] ID.-Loss AND CONDEMNATION OF WATER RIGHTS-ABANDONMENT--
EVIDll:NCE-SEEPAGE FROM WATER SYSTEM.-The evidence was suf-
ficient to show a city's prescriptive right to all the waters in cer-
tain eanyons as against a claim of abandonment of seepage from 
the system (a) where there was no evidence of seepage continuing 
uninterruptedly for a time sufficient to establish a prescriptive title 
in one appropriating the escaping waters, and (b) where the evi-
dence showed diligence on the part of the city in making repairs 
to its system and the reconstruction thereof when repairs were 
no longer economical. 
[3] ID.-USER OF WA'i.'ER RIGHTS-EASEMENTS IN REGARD TO USE OF 
WATER-TRANSFER AND Loss-Loss-CHANGE OF LOCATION OF PIPE 
LINE,--The easement of a city to maintain a pipe line over privately 
owned land is not forfeited by changes of location during recon-
struction where the deviations were insubstantial, and were wholly 
within the limits of ten and twenty foot strips of land which the 
eity was entitled to use. 
2. See 26 Cal. Jur. 246; 27 R. C. L. 1281. 
McK. DIg. References: 1. Waters, § 718; 2. Waters, § 347; 3. Waters, 
§ 253; 4. Easements, § 36; 5. Waters, § 136; 6. Waters, § 126; 7. Waters, 
§ 737 (9); 8. Waters, §§ lOS, 739 • 
,~ 
